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High github · GHSA-vvr2-h2jp-838m

Code Graph RAG: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read

Published Nov 9, 2026 CVSS 7.5

Summary

The read_file MCP tool in codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py contains a path traversal vulnerability in its paginated branch (when offset or limit is supplied). The handler constructs a file path using Path(self.project_root) / file_path without subsequently validating that the resolved path remains within the configured project root. Python's pathlib silently discards the left-hand component when the right-hand argument is an absolute path, allowing an attacker to read any UTF-8-readable file on the server by passing an absolute path such as /etc/passwd.

Details

Vulnerable location: codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556–565 (MCPToolsRegistry.read_file)

The read_file MCP tool accepts three parameters: file_path, offset, and limit. When either offset or limit is present the handler takes a distinct code path:

# codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556-565
async def read_file(
    self, file_path: str, offset: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None
) -> str:
    logger.info(lg.MCP_READ_FILE.format(path=file_path, offset=offset, limit=limit))
    try:
        if offset is not None or limit is not None:
            full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path   # ← VULNERABLE LINE
            start = offset if offset is not None else 0

            with open(full_path, encoding=cs.ENCODING_UTF8) as f:   # ← SINK

Because pathlib.Path.__truediv__ replaces the left operand entirely when the right operand is an absolute path, any caller-supplied absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ) causes full_path to point outside the project root.

The non-paginated branch is protected by the @validate_project_path decorator (applied via codebase_rag/tools/file_reader.py:27) which performs .resolve().relative_to(project_root) (codebase_rag/decorators.py:73–75), but this decorator is never invoked in the paginated branch, leaving it completely unguarded.

Full data-flow (source → sink):

  1. codebase_rag/config.py:302 — HTTP MCP default host is 0.0.0.0.
  2. codebase_rag/cli.py:717 — CLI exposes mcp-server.
  3. codebase_rag/cli.py:726–731 — --transport http invokes serve_http(host=resolved_host, port=resolved_port).
  4. codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:208–210 — Starlette mounts the MCP HTTP endpoint.
  5. codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:227–249 — read_file is registered as an MCP tool accepting attacker-controlled file_path, offset, and limit.
  6. codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:113–127 — call_tool dispatches JSON arguments directly to the handler via await handler(**arguments).
  7. codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:561–565 — paginated branch builds full_path and calls open(full_path) without any boundary check.

The vulnerability is also present when using the stdio transport because the vulnerable code path does not depend on transport type; however, the attack is unauthenticated and network-accessible only when HTTP transport is configured.

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • Docker installed.
  • Repository cloned with the vuln-001/ artifacts present (Dockerfile, poc.py).

Build and run:

# From the repository root (parent of vuln-001/)
docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm vuln001-poc

The Dockerfile installs the codebase_rag package from the local repository source, creates a "safe" project root at /tmp/safe-project-root, and runs poc.py.

What the PoC does (poc.py):

  1. Pre-mocks the mgclient / pymgclient native C extensions (Memgraph client) so the package imports without a live database.
  2. Instantiates MCPToolsRegistry via object.__new__(), setting only self.project_root = "/tmp/safe-project-root" — matching what the real server does.
  3. Demonstrates the pathlib bypass: Path("/tmp/safe-project-root") / "/etc/hosts" resolves to Path("/etc/hosts").
  4. Calls registry.read_file("/etc/hosts", offset=0, limit=5) — the actual vulnerable method from the installed package.
  5. Asserts that real /etc/hosts content is returned, confirming full boundary bypass.

Expected output:

[MCP] read_file: /etc/hosts (offset=0, limit=5)
[+] CONFIRMED: pathlib discards project_root when file_path is absolute
[+] read_file() returned:
# Lines 1-5 of 7
127.0.0.1	localhost
::1	localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00::	ip6-localnet
ff00::	ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1	ip6-allnodes
[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL
[+] Content of '/etc/hosts' exfiltrated via path traversal
[+] Project root boundary '/tmp/safe-project-root' was completely bypassed
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: VULN-001 CWE-22 Path Traversal

Equivalent HTTP transport attack (when server is running):

python3 -  /tmp/safe-project-root/README.md

COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py

CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read
=============================================================================
Repository : vitali87/code-graph-rag
Version    :

Affected AI Products

huggingface qdrant
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