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Medium github · GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5

Kubeshark: MCP `download_file` writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path

Published Nov 16, 2026 CVSS 5.3

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints. download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default, non---allow-destructive posture).

Introduced in

Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)", 2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt (dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before v53.1.0 is affected.

Details

In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight from the tool arguments:

  • dest was passed directly to os.Create(dest) with no confinement — no filepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or ../ traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.
  • path was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)

The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic (credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not part of this advisory's fix.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install: export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

Impact

  • Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running kubeshark mcp, as that user.
  • Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
  • Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

  • AV:N → AV:L. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.
  • I:H → I:L. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running kubeshark mcp (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls where the bytes land, not what they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.
  • A:L → A:N. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the original A:L is unsupported.

Kubeshark kept C:H: on a default community install the Hub API answers unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept AC:H (the attacker must land an injection in content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), PR:N (download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive needed), UI:R (an operator must be driving an agent against kubeshark mcp), and S:U (the impact stays within the local user's authorization scope).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go:

  • dest is resolved through secureDownloadDest and confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); a dest that resolves outside the base (via ../ or an absolute path) is rejected.
  • path is rejected if it contains .. segments.
  • Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked subdirectory inside the base (or a dest that is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with O_NOFOLLOW where the platform provides it.
  • Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).

Workarounds

  • Run kubeshark mcp as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Enable Hub authentication (AUTH_ENABLED=true + an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.

Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)

  • Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub path (current fix only rejects ..).
  • Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).

Affected AI Products

prompt injection indirect prompt mcp server ai agent
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