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High github · GHSA-8vf2-hxg5-crqh

Kubeshark: MCP `start_kubeshark` argument injection via `pod_regex` → image redirect → cluster takeover

Published Nov 16, 2026 CVSS 7.2

Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool start_kubeshark Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the MCP command's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

Summary

The start_kubeshark MCP tool builds a kubeshark tap command by appending the caller-supplied pod_regex as a bare positional argument, with no -- end-of-options separator. Because tap is a cobra command, a pod_regex that begins with -/--set= is parsed as a flag, not as the pod regex. An attacker who can influence the tool arguments (e.g. indirect prompt injection against an agent driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive) can inject arbitrary --set Helm value overrides — notably tap.docker.registry / tap.docker.tag — redirecting the deployed worker/hub/front images to an attacker-controlled registry. The worker DaemonSet runs privileged with hostNetwork and the host filesystem mounted, so an attacker image yields node and cluster-admin compromise.

Introduced in

Commit 0bbbb473 — "[1] Add MCP (Model Context Protocol) server command (#1832)", 2026-02-06 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~23). The pod_regex argument has been appended as a bare positional since the tool's introduction; there is no regression window, every MCP-capable release is affected.

Details

In callStartKubeshark (cmd/mcpRunner.go), the command was built as ["tap", , "-n", …, "--set", …, "--set", "headless=true"] with pod_regex inserted as a raw element. cobra parses flags positionally-agnostic and there was no -- guard, so pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=…,tap.docker.tag=…" became a real --set. The tool is only registered when kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive is set.

Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)

Driving kubeshark mcp --allow-destructive: start_kubeshark with pod_regex="--set=tap.docker.registry=,tap.docker.tag=" caused the CLI to construct kubeshark tap --set=… --set headless=true, deploying an attacker image. The image ran as root inside the privileged worker container and read the host's cluster-admin kubeconfigs (/etc/kubernetes/super-admin.conf, admin.conf, pki/) — i.e. cluster-admin takeover from a single pod_regex value.

Impact

Full Kubernetes cluster compromise (cluster-admin) from a single injected tool argument, when the operator runs the MCP server with --allow-destructive.

Severity rationale

Kubeshark scores this 7.2 High, down from the reporter's 8.3, on two metrics. The impact half of the vector (S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) is unchanged — cluster-admin takeover is real and Kubeshark does not contest it.

  • AV:N → AV:L. kubeshark mcp is a local stdio MCP server with no network listener. The attacker's payload reaches it as content an agent running on that host ingested and replayed into a local tool call. The poisoned content may have travelled over a network, but the exploited interface is local.
  • PR:N → PR:H. Two administrative preconditions must already hold on the target host: the operator must have started the MCP server with the explicit, non-default --allow-destructive flag (without it start_kubeshark is not registered at all), and that host must already hold a kubeconfig with permission to deploy the privileged Kubeshark DaemonSet. The attacker is borrowing an existing high-privilege context, not gaining one.

Kubeshark kept AC:H (the injection must land in content the agent ingests, and the attacker must stand up a malicious registry/image), UI:R (an operator must be actively driving the agent), and S:C (the compromise crosses from the CLI's authorization scope into the Kubernetes cluster — this is what keeps the score in the High band).

Patches

Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).

In cmd/mcpRunner.go: pod_regex is now appended last, after a literal -- end-of-options separator, so it is always parsed as the [POD REGEX] positional and can never be interpreted as a flag. (namespaces / release_namespace are passed through -n / -s value flags, which consume their value token and are therefore not injectable.)

Workarounds

  • Do not run kubeshark mcp with --allow-destructive unless required.
  • Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
  • Restrict the kubeconfig/permissions available to the machine running the MCP server.

Affected AI Products

model context protocol prompt injection indirect prompt mcp server
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